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Abstract
■ People often make shortsighted decisions to receive small
benefits in the present rather than large benefits in the future,
that is, to favor their current selves over their future selves. In
two studies using fMRI, we demonstrated that people make such
decisionsinpartbecausetheyfailtoengageinthesamedegreeof
self-referential processing when thinking about their future
selves. When participants predicted how much they would enjoy
an event in the future, they showed less activity in brain regions
associated with introspective self-reference—such as the ventro-
medial pFC (vMPFC)—than when they predicted how much they
would enjoy events in the present. Moreover, the magnitude of
vMPFC reduction predicted the extent to which participants
made shortsighted monetary decisions several weeks later. In
light of recent findings that the vMPFC contributes to the ability
to simulate future events from a first-person perspective, these
data suggest that shortsighted decisions result in part from a
failure to fully imagine the subjective experience of oneʼsf u t u r e
self. ■
INTRODUCTION
One of the enduring mysteries of human behavior is that
people who can foresee the consequences of shortsighted
decisionsmakethemanyway(Berns,Laibson,&Loewenstein,
2007; Soman et al., 2005; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989;
Ainslie, 1975). People nap when they should be working,
snack when they should be dieting, spend when they should
be saving—and they do these things despite knowing full
well that they will regret them later. In these and other fa-
miliar instances, people consign their future selves to pay
the costs they incur in the present. Why do human beings
so often impose substantial burdens on their future selves
to maximize immediate rewards?
One answer to this question posits that intertemporal
choices—those that have consequences at more than
one point in time—can be modeled as a form of intra-
personal bargaining among multiple “selves” (Ainslie,
1975, 1992; Schelling, 1984; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Elster,
1979). Because predictions about what will make oneʼs
future self happy may differ from oneʼs immediate desires
in the present, intertemporal choice requires negotiating
among oneʼs competing interests at these different times
(“Iʼd like to stay for another drink, but will probably regret
it tomorrowmorning”).On this view,when we successfully
assignequalvaluetothe interests ofourfutureand present
selves, we may be able to suppress our present desires
in favor of a future benefit. In contrast, to the extent that
we perceive our future self as “someone else”—a distinct
entity whose preferences are distinct from or less impor-
tant than those of our present self—we will tend to act
myopically against our long-term best interests. In other
words, people may tend to think of their future selves
not as they think of their present selves but as they think
of other people (Wakslak, Nussbaum, Liberman, & Trope,
2008; Pronin & Ross, 2006), and this tendency may lead
them to make impatient, shortsighted decisions.
Recent neuroimaging findings provide a novel way to
testthis suggestion. Morethana dozen studies have shown
that a region of the ventromedial pFC (vMPFC) is prefer-
entially engaged when people think about themselves—
for example, when they judge their own personality traits
or report their personal preferences (for a review, see
Mitchell, 2009; Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange, & Keenan, 2007;
Amodio & Frith, 2006; Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004)—or
about those perceived to be similar to the self (Mobbs
et al., 2009; Jenkins, Macrae, & Mitchell, 2008; Mitchell,
Macrae, & Banaji, 2006). The fact that there is a well-
established “neural signature” of self-referential processing
affords a direct test of the hypothesis that shortsighted
decision-making occurs in part because people fail to con-
sider their future interests as belonging to the self: vMPFC
activity should distinguish between judgments of oneʼs
present and future desires. Moreover, this difference
should predict individualsʼ tendency to favor their present
self by yielding to immediate desires instead of waiting for
future rewards.
To test these predictions, participants in two experiments
were scanned while completing an affective forecasting
task (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007) in which they predicted how
much they would enjoy engaging in each of a series of activ-
ities (e.g., “spend the afternoon in a modern art museum”)
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later).Participantsalsocompletedoneoftwodifferentinter-
temporal choice tasks that are commonly used to measure
the extent to which people trade large future rewards for
small present rewards. Finally, participants also completed
an explicit self-reference task (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker,
1977) used to localize a region of vMPFC preferentially
engaged during introspection about oneself. We expected
(a) less vMPFC activity when participants predicted their
far future enjoyment than when they predicted their pres-
ent enjoyment, indicating that they were not bringing to
bear the same degree of self-referential processing when
thinking about their future selves than their present selves,
and (b) that the magnitude of this reduction in vMPFC
activity would correlate with the shortsightedness of par-
ticipantsʼ intertemporal decisions some time later. In Ex-
periment 2, we further tested the hypothesis that thinking
about the future self engages the same neural processes as
thinking about another person by including judgments of
others as part of the affective forecasting task.
METHODS
Participants
Participants were right-handed, native English speakers
withnohistoryofneurologicalproblemswhogaveconsent
in a manner approved by the Human Studies Committee
at the Massachusetts General Hospital and the Committee
on the Use of Human Subjects at Harvard University. Ex-
periment 1 included 19 participants (13 women, mean
age = 21.3 years). Experiment 2 included a different set
of 19 participants (13 women, mean age = 20.9 years).
Affective Forecasting Task
In both experiments, participants were scanned as they
performed an affective forecasting task. During this task,
participants indicated how much they would enjoy en-
gaging in 120 relatively pleasurable but somewhat time-
consuming activities (such as running in a charity race or
watching the sunrise) at each of two points in time: either
“in the next 24 hours” (present) or “this time next year”
(future). Participants responded on a 4-point scale (1 =
not at all to 4 = very much). In Experiment 1, the affective
forecasting task comprised 120 predictions of enjoyment
of present activities (self-present) and 120 predictions of
enjoyment of future activities (self-future).
In Experiment 2, the affective forecasting task also re-
quired participants to predict another personʼsp r e s e n t
and future enjoyment of activities. Before beginning the
task, participants were told that research has shown that
people can make accurate judgments of others with very
little information. On “other” trials, participants saw a
photograph of another person and were asked to use
the 4-point scale to predict how much she would enjoy
an activity “within the next day” or “this time next year.”
During scanning, “other” trials were cued with the photo
of this person, whereas “self” trials were cued with a
chalk outline of a head (Jenkins et al., 2008; Mitchell
et al., 2006). Experiment 2 included 60 activities, which
participants judged once in each of the four conditions:
self-present, self-future, other-present, and other-future.
In both experiments, the duration of trials was 3800 msec,
divided into four functional runs of 450 sec each.
Self-reference Task
Following the affective forecasting task in both experi-
ments, participants completed a “self-reference” task that
h a sf r e q u e n t l yb e e nu s e dt ol o c a l i z eb r a i nr e g i o n st h a t
respond when people are thinking about the self (Kelley
et al., 2002; for a review, see Mitchell, 2009). Across two
functional runs (260 sec each), participants saw a single
trait word (e.g., curious, neurotic), accompanied by a
cue indicating one of two people. For “self” trials (n =
50), participants were asked to use a 4-point scale to in-
dicate how well the trait described them. For “other” trials
(n = 50), participants were asked to use the same scale
to indicate how well the trait described George Bush
(Experiment 1) or Barack Obama (Experiment 2). Our
choices of “other” were guided by previous studies of
self-referential thought, which have generally used judg-
ments of the current head of state (someone who is
familiar, but not personally known) as a comparison to
judgments of the self (Symons & Johnson, 1997; Rogers
et al., 1977). Trials on both tasks were intermixed in a
pseudorandom order and separated by a variable ISI (200–
8000 msec) during which participants passively viewed a
fixation crosshair.
Intertemporal Choice Tasks
Two different intertemporal choice tasks were used
across experiments to measure individual differences in
discounting of future monetary rewards. Between 12 and
110 days after scanning, 15 participants in Experiment 1
made 20 choices between a small reward to be delivered
immediately (a $10 gift certificate to Amazon.com deliv-
ered immediately via email) and a large reward to be deliv-
ered 1 month later (Becker, DeGroot, & Marschak, 1964).
Over 20 trials, the amount of the large reward increased
from $11 to $30 in increments of $1. Participants were
informed that at the end of the experiment, one of the
20 choices would be selected randomly and enacted. The
dependent measure was the smallest reward for which
each participant was willing to wait 1 month.
Immediately after scanning, all participants in Experi-
ment 2 made 144 choices between a small reward to be
delivered immediately ($10 in cash to be delivered im-
mediately by the experimenter) or a large reward to be
2 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 23, Number 4delivered at a future time (a check to be delivered by mail).
The value of the large reward ranged from $12 to $26 in
increments of $2, and the future times were 1, 7, 30, 60,
1 8 0 ,a n d3 6 5d a y s ,r e s u l t i n gi n4 8d i f f e r e n tl a r g ef u t u r er e -
wards, each of which participants considered three times.
Participants were informed that at the end of the experi-
ment, one choice would be selected randomly and enacted.
The dependent measure was the participantʼs discount
rate k (computed as described below).
Imaging Procedure
The same imaging parameters were used in both experi-
ments. Functional data were collected on a 3-T Siemens
Trio scanner (31 axial slices, 5 mm thick, 1 mm skip, repe-
tition time = 2 sec, echo time = 35 msec, 3.75 × 3.75 in-
plane resolution). Functional data were preprocessed and
analyzed using SPM2 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive
Neurology, London, UK), including slice-timing correc-
tion, normalization into the Montreal Neurological Insti-
tute anatomical space (3-mm isotropic voxels), and spatial
smoothing (8-mm FWHM using a Gaussian kernel). The
event-related design was modeled using a canonical hemo-
dynamic response function. Analysis was performed in-
dividually for each participant, and contrast images were
subsequently entered into a second-level analysis treating
participants as a random effect. Brain regions that differen-
tiated between conditions were identified using a statistical
criterion of 90 or more contiguous voxels at a voxel-wise
threshold of p < .001, providing an experiment-wise
threshold of p < .05, corrected for multiple comparisons
(S. Slotnick, Boston College). ANOVA procedures were
conducted on the parameter estimates extracted from ROI




Consistent with earlier research (e.g., Zauberman & Lynch,
2005), participants reported that they would enjoy activ-
ities more in a year (M =2 . 8 2 ,SD = 0.43) than in the next
24 hours (M =2 . 6 3 ,SD = 0.43), t(18) = 2.31, p <. 0 5 ,d =
.54. Response times were equivalent for future (M =1 8 8 3
msec, SD = 355.1) and present (M = 1861 msec, SD =
326.5) trials, p >. 3 6 .
We first examined differences in fMRI BOLD response as-
sociated with participantsʼ predictions of their present and
future enjoyment by conducting a whole-brain analysis of
present > future trials. Consistent with the hypothesis that
predicting future enjoyment involves less self-referential
processing than predicting present enjoyment, this contrast
identified a sizeable region of vMPFC (Figure 1). We also
observed medial parietal cortex, a region that has likewise
been observed consistently during tasks that require in-
trospection about oneself (Moran, Macrae, Heatherton,
Wyland, & Kelley, 2006; Johnson et al., 2002; Kelley et al.,
2002; Zysset, Huber, Ferstl, & von Cramon, 2002) as well
as an additional locus in left occipital cortex. As in the pre-
ponderance of studies that have examined vMPFC and me-
dial parietal cortex, modulation of activity in these regions
took the form of “deactivations” relative to resting baseline
(for a discussion, see Gusnard & Raichle, 2001).
Intertemporal Choice Task
On average, participants required $14.27 to wait 1 month in
lieu of an immediate reward of $10. Critically, the amount
that participants required to wait was correlated significantly
Figure 1. Brain regions that demonstrated greater activity during judgments of oneʼs present enjoyment than future enjoyment in Experiment 1.
(A) A random-effect general linear model analysis revealed three regions that were significantly more engaged by judgments of present > future
enjoyment, p < .05, corrected for multiple comparisons: the vMPFC (436 voxels in extent, centered at MNI coordinates −14, 48, 0), the medial
parietal cortex (388 voxels centered at −16, −54, 24), and the left occipital cortex (338 voxels centered at −20, −80, −4). (B) Mean parameter
estimates of this vMPFC region for present (solid black) and future (striped gray) judgments. (C) Critically, a significant relation was observed
between participantsʼ discounting of a delayed reward (measured by the minimum value that a participant required to delay receipt of a reward
by 1 month) and the BOLD response difference between present and future judgments in the vMPFC.
Mitchell et al. 3with vMPFC differences between predictions of present and
future enjoyment. Specifically, the greater the difference in
vMPFC response when participants made predictions about
the present > future, the more money they required to
wait1month(Figure1),r(13)=.54,p<.05;Spearmanrank
correlation, ρ(13) = .44, p < .10. This effect was specific to
the vMPFC: the magnitude of the amount required to wait
was not correlated with BOLD response in either medial
parietal,r(13)=−.14,oroccipitalcortex,r(13)=−.08.This
finding is all the more remarkable given that participants in
Experiment 1 completed the intertemporal choice between
2 weeks and 4 months after scanning.
This effect was highlighted when we compared vMPFC
activation across groups of participants defined by perfor-
mance on the intertemporal choice task. “Patient” partici-
pants (n = 5) were willing to wait a month for even the
minimum amount of $11, whereas “impatient” participants
(n = 10) required an average of $15.90 to wait a month
(range = $12–25). Although the vMPFC response of the
patient participants did not differ between predictions of
present or future enjoyment (Mdiff = 0.04, p > .69), the
vMPFC response of the impatient participants was consid-
erably greater when they made predictions about their
present than about their future enjoyment (Mdiff =0 . 3 0 ,
p < .003). This between-group difference was supported
by the marginally significant interaction of Group (patient,
impatient) × Time Horizon (present, future), F(1, 14) =
6.01, p <. 0 6 ,d =. 6 6 .
Experiment 2
Affective Forecasting Task
As in Experiment 1, participants predicted that they would
enjoy activities more in a year (M =3 . 1 4 ,SD =0 . 5 8 )t h a n
in the next 24 hours (M =2 . 8 5 ,SD = 0.74), t(18) = 3.21,
p < .005, d = .76. In contrast, when judging the prefer-
ences of another person, participants differentiated only
marginally between future (M =3 . 2 7 ,SD = 0.48) and pres-
ent (M =3 . 1 4 ,SD =0 . 5 6 ) ,t(18) = 1.98, p >. 0 6 ,d =. 4 7 .
That perceivers distinguished more between the future
and the present for self than for other was confirmed
by a significant two-way interaction of Time (present,
future) × Target (self, other), F(1, 18) = 4.76, p < .05,
d =. 5 1 .P a r t i c i p a n t s ʼ response times were equivalent for
self-present (M =1 8 3 3m s e c ,SD = 230), self-future (M =
1828 msec, SD = 222), other-present (M = 1860 msec,
SD = 250), and other-future (M =1 8 4 9m s e c ,SD =2 6 5 )
trials; p > .19 for all pairwise comparisons.
As in Experiment 1, we next examined differences in
the patternsoffMRI BOLDresponse associated with partic-
ipantsʼ predictions of their present and future enjoyment
by conducting a random-effect, whole-brain analysis of pres-
ent > future trials, collapsing across targets (self, other).
Replicating our earlier result, this contrast identified vMPFC
(Figure 2) as well as additional loci in medial parietal cortex
and superior frontal gyrus. Consistent with the observation
that this vMPFC region similarly distinguishes between self
Figure 2. Brain regions that
demonstrated greater activity
during judgments of present
enjoyment than future
enjoyment in Experiment 2.
(A) A random-effect general
linear model analysis revealed
three regions that were
significantly more engaged
by judgments of present >
future enjoyment: the vMPFC
(106 voxels in extent, centered
at MNI coordinates 2, 56,
12), the medial parietal
cortex 595 voxels centered at
0, −58, 18), and the superior
frontal gyrus (163 voxels
centered at 26, 40, 50). (B)
Mean parameter estimates
of this vMPFC region for
self-present, self-future,
other-present, and other-future
trials. (C) A significant relation
was observed between
participantsʼ discounting of
delayed rewards and the
BOLD response difference
between present > future in
the vMPFC for judgments of
self (left); a marginal relation
was observed for judgments
of other (right).
4 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 23, Number 4and other, analysis of the parameter estimates associated
with each of the four trial types revealed significantly greater
activity for judgments of self > other, F(1, 18) = 5.70, p <
.03, d = .56. In contrast, no interaction of time and target
was observed, suggesting that this region differentiated
presentfromfuturethinkingsimilarlyforbothselfandother.
Suggestively, the vMPFC difference between self-future and
self-present trials was significantly correlated with the ab-
solute difference between participantsʼ predictions of how
much they would enjoy activities at the two times, r(17) =
.52, p < .03. That is, the participants who predicted that
they would enjoy an activity much more or much less in
the future than in the present were the participants for
whom vMPFC activity was most reduced when predicting
future rather than present enjoyment. Although trending
in the same direction, the corresponding value for Experi-
ment 1 did not approach significance, r(17) = .27, p =. 2 6 .
Intertemporal Choice Task
On each trial, participants chose between a small immedi-
ate reward and a large future reward whose value and time
ofdeliveryvariedrandomlyfromtrialtotrial.Onthebasisof
these choices, we estimated a “discount rate” (i.e., a mea-
sure of shortsightedness or impatience) for each partici-
pant. Consistent with previous findings (Laibson, 1997),
the discount functions for all participants were well charac-




where SV is subjective value, D is delay (in days), and k is
a participant-specific constant that corresponds to the dis-
count rate (Kable & Glimcher, 2007). The best fitting k
parameter varied widely across participants, such that our
most patient participant (k = 0.002) was willing to wait
2 months for $12 over an immediate gain of $10, whereas
our least patient participant (k = 0.262) preferred $10 im-
mediatelyover $26in 1 week. Critically, as in Experiment1,
the discount rate correlated significantly with the extent of
vMPFC difference between predictions of future and pres-
ent preferences, r(17) = .52, p <. 0 3 ;ρ(17) = .41 p <. 1 0
(see Figure 2). That is, the least patient participants (as
indexed by higher k values) showed the greatest reduction
in vMPFC activity when predicting their own future rather
than present enjoyment. Only a marginal correlation was
observed between k a n dt h er e d u c t i o ni nv M P F Ca c t i v -
ity that occurred when predicting another personʼsf u -
ture rather than present enjoyment, r(17) = .33, p =. 1 6 ;
however, these correlations do not differ significantly from
oneanother, Z =0 . 6 6 ,p = .51(see Discussion). Moreover,
as in Experiment 1, the participantʼsd i s c o u n tr a t ew a ss i g -
nificantly correlated with a reduction of activity only in
vMPFC, although marginal correlations were also observed
in medial parietal cortex, r(17) = .33, p = .16, and the
superior frontal gyrus, r(17) = .36, p =. 1 3 .
Auxiliary ROI Analysis
Wereplicatedthefindingsofbothexperimentsinasecond-
ary vMPFC region defined by an explicit self-reference task
used to isolate brain regions preferentially engaged during
introspection about the self (Kelley et al., 2002; Rogers
et al., 1977). Replicating earlier studies, the contrast of self
> other identified a sizeable region of vMPFC in both ex-
periments (Figure 3). We then interrogated these alterna-
tive ROI for differences in the BOLD response associated
with participantsʼ predictions of present and future enjoy-
ment. Like the primary region of vMPFC, activity in this
alternative region was greater when participants predicted
present than future enjoyment: Experiment 1, F(1, 18) =
10.89, p < .004, d = .78; Experiment 2, F(1, 18) = 4.46,
p<.05,d=.50(collapsingacrossselfandother).Likewise,
the BOLD difference in this region during predictions of
present and future enjoyment correlated strongly with in-
tertemporaldiscounting:Experiment1,r(13)=.64;Experi-
ment 2, r(17) = .47, both ps < .05; ρ(13) = .45, p <. 1 0
and ρ(17) = .25, ns, respectively. These findings are partic-
ularly compelling given that these alternative vMPFC ROIs
were defined independently from a well-characterized self-
reference task conducted within separate functional runs.
Like the primary ROI, the vMPFC difference between self-
future and self-present trials in Experiment 2 was significantly
correlated with the absolute difference between participantsʼ
predictions of how much they would enjoy activities at the
two time horizons, r(17) = .51, p < .03; the corresponding
value for Experiment 1 was r(17) = .32, p =. 1 8 .
DISCUSSION
The vMPFC has consistently been linked to tasks that re-
quire people to think about themselves, such as judging
their own personality traits or reporting their preferences
(Mitchell, 2009; Uddin et al., 2007; Amodio & Frith, 2006;
Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004). Damage to this region im-
pairstheabilitytoreportastablesetofpreferences(Fellows
& Farah, 2007) and leads to a broad range of deficits in
assigning personal value to different outcomes (Fellows,
2006; Damasio, 1994). The present study capitalized on
these observations to test the hypothesis that people who
fail to engage in such self-referential processing when con-
sidering their future selves tend to prefer small rewards
inthepresenttolargerewardsinthefuture.Consistentwith
this hypothesis, we observed less vMPFC activity when par-
ticipants predicted how much they would enjoy an event
in the future than when they estimated how much they
would enjoy the same event in the present, suggesting that
on average, people do not engage in self-referential pro-
cessing when thinking about their future selves. Indeed, in
Experiment 2, vMPFC response was nearly identical when
people tried to predict their future enjoyment (M = −1.23)
and another personʼsp r e s e n te n j o y m e n t( M = −1.11),
consistent with the notion that, in some ways, people tend
to think of their future selves as they think of other people.
Mitchell et al. 5Importantly, the magnitude of this vMPFC difference
between judgments of present and future enjoyment pre-
dicted the impatience or shortsightedness of peopleʼsi n -
tertemporal choices. Those participants in whom vMPFC
activity most differentiated between predictions of present
and future enjoyment tended to make the most impatient
decisions, preferring small present rewards to large future
rewards. In contrast, participants in whom vMPFC did not
differentiate between predictions of present and future
enjoymenttendedtomakethemostpatientdecisions,pre-
ferring large future rewards to small present rewards. This
correlation was observed across two different measures of
intertemporal choice and in Experiment 1 was obtained
despitethefactthattheintertemporalchoicetaskoccurred
weeksormonthsafterscanning.Suchobservationssuggest
that the failure to think self-referentially about our future
selves may represent a stable individual difference that
has significant real-world consequences.
Relation to Existing Research on Valuation and
Decision-making
The present results converge with those of a series of re-
cent imaging studies that have examined the functional
neuroanatomy of valuation and decision-making (Hare,
Camerer,&Rangel,2009;Luhmann,Chun,Yi,Lee,&Wang,
2008;Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007; Montague, King-
Casas, & Cohen, 2006; Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure, &
Cohen, 2006; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen,
2004; Knutson, Fong, Bennett, Adams, & Hommer, 2003;
Montague&Berns,2002;Breiter,Aharon,Kahneman,Dale,
& Shizgal, 2001; OʼDoherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak, &
Andrews, 2001), a project sometimes described as “neuro-
economics.” This work has identified two brain regions
that together allow humans and other animals to evaluate
different potential courses of action and their associated
outcomes—theventralstriatumandtheOFC.Asmallnum-
ber ofstudies(Hare etal., 2009;Luhmann etal.,2008; Tom
etal.,2007)havealsoindicatedarolefor aregionofvMPFC
similar to the one observed in the current experiments.
However, exactly how the vMPFC contributes to valuation
and decision-making remains unspecified, in part because
researchers in this field have tended to use “vMPFC” to
refer interchangeably to both the OFC and the distinct
paracingulate region to which that term more typically
refers, regions separated by as much as 25 mm (e.g., see
Hare et al., 2009). Consistent with its use across the neuro-
imaging literatureonself-reference, “vMPFC” hererefers to
Figure 3. Secondary analyses identified a region of vMPFC from the comparison of self > other on an explicit self-reference task for both
(A) Experiment 1 (294 voxels centered at −14, 44, 0) and (B) Experiment 2 (281 voxels centered at −8, 40, 4), p < .05, corrected for multiple
comparisons. Middle panels display the parameter estimates extracted from these ROI on the affective forecasting task. As for the primary
vMPFC regions, a significant relation was observed between participantsʼ discounting of delayed rewards and the BOLD response difference
between judgments of their present and future enjoyment of activities.
6 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 23, Number 4an area of paracingulate cortex roughly in plane with the
genu of the corpus callosum, a region whose involvement
in valuation has been limited to situations in which partici-
pants choose between two alternatives, such as between
monetary rewards delivered at different times (Luhmann
et al., 2008; McClure et al., 2004), different monetary gam-
bles(Tometal.,2007),orhealthyandunhealthyfoods(Hare
et al., 2009). Although this finding is consistent with the
role of the vMPFC in reporting oneʼs preferences and atti-
tudes (for a review, see Mitchell, 2009), neuroeconomists
have not yet clearly articulated how the valuation processes
subserved by this region distinguish it from the OFC.
One such possibility is suggested by recent findings that
the vMPFC plays an important role in simulating counter-
factual experiences. When individualsareaskedtoenvision
a hypothetical event in the future, to remember an event
from the past, or to imagine what another person feels or
thinks, a set of regions that include the vMPFC is reliably
engaged (Buckner & Carroll, 2007). Importantly, vMPFC
appearstocontributeto suchsimulations totheextent that
they include high levels of self-relevance, such as experi-
encing the scene from oneʼs own perspective (Hassabis
& Maguire, 2009) or mentalizing about others who are
highly similar to oneself (Jenkins et al., 2008; Mitchell
et al., 2006). Taken together, these findings suggest that
the vMPFC may contribute to valuation and preference by
allowing individuals to simulate the subjective experience
associated with potential events, for example, by imagining
oneself engaging in an activity or experiencing some out-
come and then “reading off” resulting affective states as a
basis for evaluating its desirability. Situations in which one
must compare multiple choices may provoke especially
highlevelsofvMPFCactivity,totheextentthattheyrequire
more than one such simulation.
This account contrasts with assumptions that valuation
can be accomplished by assigning stored or inferred values
to different outcomes. In particular, the current data belie
suggestions that the vMPFC contributes to valuation by
providing a direct signal of outcome desirability, that is,
by showing greater activation to positive outcomes and
reduced activity to negative ones (Tom et al., 2007). In
the current studies, future activities were on average rated
more positively than those same events in the present.
However, we observed less vMPFC activity when partici-
pants contemplated those future events, in sharp contrast
to predictions that vMPFC activity correlates simply with
outcomedesirability.Inlightofthesizeablenumberofstud-
ies documenting the contributions of this region to self-
referential thought and to imagining oneʼs future subjective
experience, a more attractive explanation for the role of
vMPFC in valuation focuses on its involvement in simulat-
ing different potential events and comparing the affective
concomitants of each.
This ability to simulate counterfactual experiences may
contribute to the uniquely human capacity for considering
novel and hypothetical outcomes at arbitrary points in the
future. Whereas other animals can wait no longer than a
minute or two for a larger reward (Stevens, Hallinan, &
Hauser, 2005; Tobin, Logue, Chelonis, Ackerman, & May,
1996; Mazur & Logue, 1978; Ainslie, 1974), humans can
delay immediate gratification indefinitely in the service of
later gains (Mischel et al., 1989). Interestingly, no clear
homologueforvMPFC(morespecifically,theparacingulate
sulcus) has been identified in monkeys (Ongur, Ferry, &
Price, 2003), suggesting that other animals may simply lack
the functional architecture needed to conceive of a future
self and act in its best interests (Gilbert, 2007).
Relation to Existing Research on Self-reference
Our findings also complement those of Ersner-Hershfield,
Wimmer, and Knutson (2009), who identified a region of
rostral ACC (rACC) that differentiated between thinking
about future and present self and linked this difference
to intertemporal choice. Unfortunately, Ersner-Hershfield
et al. did not establish a convincing link between self-
referential processing and shortsighted intertemporal choice.
The literature consistently shows that self-referential pro-
cessing is associated with more anterior regions of para-
cingulate cortex, such as the vMPFC (as it was in our
study) rather than the rACC (as it was in Ersner-Hershfield
et al., 2009). Indeed, the rACC has been explicitly dissoci-
ated from self-referential processing and linked instead to
stimulus valence (Moran et al., 2006), whereas vMPFC activ-
ity has been linked to the functional memory benefits as-
sociated with self-referential processing (Macrae, Moran,
Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley, 2004). Fortunately, our stud-
ies obviate any quibbles about functional localization be-
cause of our use of an independent, explicit self-reference
task that has emerged as the preferred procedure for iso-
lating brain regions engaged by introspection about the self.
Replicating more than a dozen studies (Mitchell, 2009), this
task identified a region of vMPFC, in which activity not only
differentiated between predictions of future and present
enjoyment but also predicted intertemporal choices made
weeks or months later. By independently localizing brain
regions involved in making predictions about the self, these
observations establish a specific link between intertemporal
choice and self-referential processing. Moreover, whereas
Ersner-Hershfield et al. frequently used lenient statistical
criteria (as high as p < .01, uncorrected; see their Figure 2),
we used a corrected criterion of p < .05 to mitigate the
doubt produced by neuroimaging findings that use uncor-
rected statistical thresholds.
In addition to these neuroanatomical and statistical prob-
lems, Ersner-Hershfield et al. (2009) relied exclusively on
an experimental task that has no conceptual relation with
intertemporal choice. Specifically, their participants were
scannedwhilemakinginferencesaboutthepersonalitytraits
they might possess in 10 years—a prediction that has little
to do with making a choice between a small present reward
and a large future reward. In contrast, our affective fore-
casting task—w h i c ha s k sp e o p l et oc o n s i d e rh o wm u c h
they will enjoy activities at different points in time—has
Mitchell et al. 7a demonstrable relation to intertemporal choice and is
strongly predictive of individual discount rates (Kassam,
Gilbert, Boston, & Wilson, 2008).
vMPFC Contributions to
“Self-referential Processing”
Throughout this article, we have described the functions
subservedbythevMPFCintheverybroadestmanner,using
the term “self-referential processing.” Although this region
isindeedreliablyengagedduringintrospectionaboutoneʼs
ownpreferences,emotions,andpersonalitytraits(Mitchell,
2009), referring to vMPFC processing as “self-referential”
does little to explicate the precise cognitive operations
carried out by this area. As reviewed above, several lines
of research have made more specific suggestions about
the nature of these operations, including its role in eval-
uating different choices and in simulating future or hypo-
thetical experiences. Together, these different literatures
suggest that vMPFC contributes to an ability to simulate
subjective experiences other than the one currently being
experienced, a capacity critical for evaluating the down-
stream consequences of a decision and for planning for
future events. Although other components of the “default
network” (such as posterior cingulate/precuneus) may also
contribute to this ability (Buckner & Carroll, 2007), we
speculate that the vMPFC most likely contributes to such
future simulation by representing the subjective affective
states associated with a simulated experience.
Although we refer to such processes as “self-referential,”
this term should primarily be understood as an imperfect
designation for a poorly characterized set of processes by
which humans represent and evaluate subjective experi-
ence. Indeed, the current data themselves suggest that
the response of vMPFC is modulated by more than just
self-reference. For example, Experiment 2 demonstrated
that vMPFC distinguished not only between introspecting
about oneʼs own preferences in the present versus future
butalsobetweenjudgingthepreferencesofothersatthese
different time horizons. This findings suggests the interest-
ing possibility that the difficulty of representing a hypo-
thetical experience increases linearly as that experience
becomes more distant from oneʼs own. That is, to the ex-
tent that simulating oneʼsf u t u r ee x p e r i e n c ei sd i f f i c u l ta n d
that simulating the experience of another person is diffi-
cult, then simulating the future experience of another per-
son will be “doubly” difficult. This view dovetails with some
accounts of “psychological distance” (Liberman & Trope,
2008; Trope & Liberman, 2003), which suggest that the
several ways in which an event can be distant from oneʼs
own current experience (temporally, spatially, and socially)
are all treated equivalently by the mind. The current data
provide some indirect support for this theory by suggest-
ing that the same brain region—vMPFC—may be sensitive
both to temporal distance (present vs. future) and to social
distance (self vs. other); moreover, earlier work has dem-
onstrated that this same region differentiates between
similar and dissimilar others, another way to manipulate
social distance (Mitchell et al., 2006). This suggestion will
needtobetestedfurther byexaminingwhetherthevMPFC
is also modulatedbyspatial distance, that is,thinkingabout
spatiallyproximalevents(inthenextroom)comparedwith
spatially distal events (in another country).
The preceding discussion makes clear that the field
does not yet have a detailed description of the cognitive
processes subserved by vMPFC. Although a better un-
derstanding of these processes is emerging rapidly from
research on the neural basis of economic choice, social
cognition, and memory—each of which has developed
a preferred terminology for describing them—there is
currently no consensus about how precisely vMPFC con-
tributes to the human cognitive repertoire. We take com-
fortin theknowledgethatotherfieldshavepassedthrough
similar points in their histories: the hippocampus was once
described as important for “episodic memory” (broadly
construed), and researchers only later began to make
more specific suggestions about how this region contrib-
utes to episodic memory, such as through associative
binding (Giovanello, Schnyer, & Verfaellie, 2004; Yonelinas,
Hopfinger, Buonocore, Kroll, & Baynes, 2001), spatial rep-
resentations (Nakazawa, McHugh, Wilson, & Tonegawa,
2004; Burgess, Maguire, & OʼKeefe, 2002), and novelty
(Lisman & Otmakhova, 2001; Knight, 1996). In much the
same way, we expect that continued research across sub-
disciplines will help clarify how specific operations sub-
served by vMPFC give rise to introspective awareness.
Conclusions
The results of the current studies have important theoreti-
cal and practical consequences for decision-making. Indi-
viduals frequently commit their future selves to do certain
activities (e.g., traveling to a relativeʼs wedding, helping a
friendmove to a newapartment, or authoring a bookchap-
ter), and their future selves often resent those commit-
ments when the time arrives to fulfill them (Gilbert, 2007;
Zauberman & Lynch, 2005). Why does this happen? The
results of the current studies suggest that people vary in
their tendency to imagine themselves experiencing future
events, that individuals least prone to such self-referential
simulation make the most impatient decisions, and that
such differences are reflected in variability in the vMPFC.
This view suggests a powerful strategy for improving inter-
temporalchoice:Whenpeoplearetryingtodecidewhether
they will want to do something in the future, they should
attempt to think of themselves doing it in the present.
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